Abstract. Since Frege's predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle's terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question-they looked at terms as standing for concepts ("Begriffe"). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran's syntax-intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, "higher" concepts-corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran's work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle's theory via predicate logic. §1. Introduction.
In Łukasiewicz's as well as in Corcoran's term logic, the proposition "All x is y" is denoted by Axy, where x and y stand for Aristotelian terms like man, animal, soul, and so forth. 2 In contrast to Frege's First-Order Logic (FOL) formalization, term logic allows two different types of interpretation, namely, intensional and extensional ones. This falls into line with a vast literature on the question whether Aristotle's terms were meant to stand for concepts or for sets of individuals (objects). We will not go into the historical details of these discussions (see Frisch, 1969) but just mention here that, since medieval times, the use of a term has been split into its extensional and intensional aspects (see the following Section 1.2). Corcoran and Martin (1997) , in their works on the completeness theorem for Aristotelian logic, have chosen differing extensional interpretations. The justification for this naming arises from the fact that, in these interpretations, each term is mapped to a certain set e(x), and "All x is y" (Ax y) is defined to be true iff e(x) ⊆ e(y). (1.1) This says that, in case of Ax y being true, y has at least as great an extension as x: The more general a concept is, the bigger is its extension. From a historical and philosophical standpoint (see the following Section 1.2), it is interesting to ask how an intensional interpretation of the ancient term logic could be constructed. In such an intensional model, terms would be mapped onto sets i(x) standing for sets of intensions or meanings contained in x , and the truth of "All x is y," Ax y, would now be equivalent to
i(x) ⊇ i(y).
( 1.2) Thus this type of interpretation would reflect the idea that the intensional content grows while proceeding to more and more special concepts, which is contrary to the way extensions behave. Leibniz was fully aware of the difference of these two methods of interpretation of Aristotle's logic, and he was the first to construct an intensional interpretation, if only in terms of his characteristic numbers. It was his idea to use pairs of numbers which has lead us to the general construction of a set theoretical intensional model of Aristotelian logic. Leibniz of course did not put his ideas into the modern framework of syntax/semantics interplay of the Tarski type, as we will do, but in hindsight it has been a big step in that direction (Glashoff, 2002) .
In the following section, we will first refer to some historical and technical details of the concepts extension and intension, and we will also point out the intrinsic difficulty of constructing intensional models of Aristotelian logic.
Extension and intension.
The dichotomy of extension and intension (or, of extension and meaning (Quine, 1951) , or, of extension and comprehension (Frisch, 1969) , or, of reference and meaning (Frege, 1967) ; in linguistics, the correponding naming is denotation and connotation (Lyons, 1977) ) has been a recurring major theme in ancient European logic since Aristotle. 3 This theme goes back to Aristotle's Theory of Categories, which makes use of the terms genus and species in order to describe the relation between higher (genus) and lower (species) terms, and it appeared later in the shape of Porphyrian trees. 4 There is a long history of the development of a precise concept of extension and intension of a term (or a concept) from Porphyry (Emilsson, 2009; Porphyry, 1975) to Arnauld and Nicole in their Port-Royal Logic. 5 Leibniz and, later, Kant, defined the extension (Umfang) of a concept to consist of those concepts that fall under the given concept; the intension (Inhalt) of a concept are those concepts that occur within the given concept. For example, to the extension of the concept "deciduous tree" there belong all the different types of deciduous trees like "birch," "cottonwood," and so forth, and to the intension of "deciduous tree" belong the-more general-concepts "tree," "plant," "casting leaves in winter," and so forth. Kant also formulated his "Law of reciprocity": "Intension and extension of a concept stand to each other in an reciprocal relation. That is to say, the more a concept contains under it, the less it contains in itself, and vice versa." 6 Leibniz' and Kant's aim of a precise definition of extension and intension was to provide a sound basis for an interpretation of syllogistic logic. 7 While these two possibilities of defining a semantics for the Aristotelian universal positive proposition Ax y (see (1.1) , (1.2) ) are quite symmetrical and, by this symmetry, do not seem to present any conceptual difficulty, there is an intrinsic complication caused by the other types of Aristotelian propositions.
In an extensional interpretation, E x y ("No x is y") is true if and only if the extensions of x and y do not overlap; that is, if and only if there is no concept z which falls under x as well as under y:
By negation, I xy ("Some x is y") holds true if and only if there is some concept z which falls under x as well as under y. 8 For example, the truth of "Some boats are houses" depends on whether there is, within the semantic domain chosen, a concept "houseboat" which falls under "house" as well as under "boat." 4 The Theory of Categories is a "rich" theory, with many different types (categories) of predicates, and with different types of relations between elements of these different categories: essential and accidental predication, genus proxima and differentia specifica or, as Grice named it, Izzing and Hazzing (Code, 1986) . In contrast to that, syllogistics-since the Analytica Priora up to Kant-is "flat": only one type of term-just terms, no further qualification. 5 The terms corresponding to extension and intension in Arnauld (1861) areétendue and compréhension. 6 Kant (1991) , my translation of: "Inhalt und Umfang eines Begriffs stehen gegeneinander in umgekehrten Verhältnis. Je mehr nämlich ein Begriff unter sich enthält, desto weniger enthält er in sich und umgekehrt." An older translation by Richardson (Kant, 1836) reads: "The matter and the sphere of a conception bear one another a converse relation. The more a conception contains under it, the less it contains in itself; and vice versa." 7 While "Kant bashing" is a common exercise in circles of modern logicians, we agree with Tolley's assessment, ". . . that many widely-held beliefs about Kant's views on logic are gravely mistaken and unfounded. I have in mind here primarily the beliefs that: (1) Kant simply inherits and repeats what the tradition has taught about logic since Aristotle, (2) his logical doctrines carry little weight in his philosophical system, and (3) his views have been so thoroughly superceded by more recent work (e.g., by Frege) that they are unable to contribute anything to contemporary debates." (Tolley, 2007) . 8 Aristotle sometimes argued in this way, called ecthesis, in his Analytica Priora.
If we try to define a similar semantics with respect to intensional logic, we run into problems. How should we interpret I xy solely in terms of the intensions of x and y? The overlapping of intensions, that is, of concepts higher than x and y, taken as criterion for the truth of I xy, will certainly not work, which is shown by the following example: The concepts "red" and "green" have the common "higher" concept "color," but of course I xy will not be true in any reasonable domain. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine situations where two concepts share no common superconcept, but nevertheless have a common subconcept.
Thus, apparently there is an "extensional bias" built into the syntax of Aristotelian logic. This is due to Aristotle's choice of "downward quantors" E and I which impedes a simple intensional definition of the truth of E x y and I xy.
It was Leibniz who, after trying for many years, found an ingenious solution to this difficulty. Put into the formalism of his characteristic numbers, he associated, with each concept x, two sets of other concepts: The first one consists, as usual, of all concepts higher than x (it corresponds to all y such that Ax y holds). The second one consists of all concepts which are definitely not contained in x, corresponding to all y such that E x y holds.
We will use this device in our definition of an intensional interpretation, and, making use of this construction of pairs of sets of intensions, it will be possible to prove a completeness theorem for intensional models of Aristotle's term logic. As a preparation for the completeness theorem, we will now present an introduction to the formal concept of interpretation and models of Aristotelian term logic.
Let:
T denote the set of categorical terms, T = {x, y, z, . . .}, and let A, I, E, O denote four logical constants. An Aristotelian sentence or proposition is any expression of the form U ξv, where U is one of the logical constants, and ξ, v are categorical terms. Let L denote the set of all sentences or propositions, and let P denote a fixed subset of L.
Extensional semantics
By an extensional interpretation e of Aristotelian term logic we will denote the following construction. Let O be a set of nonempty subsets of a given basic set M. 9 e is a function from T into O; that is, e assigns a nonempty subset X = e(x) of M, belonging to O, to each term x T . This function will be extended to a function on L by defining e(Axy) = true iff e(x) ⊆ e(y) e(Oxy) = true iff e(Axy) = false e(Exy) = true iff e(x) ∩ e(y) = ∅ e(Ixy) = true iff e(Exy) = false.
For a set P ⊂ L of sentences, e is said to be a true interpretation, if e(d) = true for all d P.
There are different methods of constructing extensional interpretations. Here we will present the construction of the Henkin-style interpretation of Martin (1997) 10 which is easier to compare with our intensional interpretation to be presented later, than Corcoran's original one.
This method of constructing an extensional true interpretation for a given set P of propositions goes roughly as follows. We choose O = 2 T , that is, the set of all subsets of the set of terms T and define, for x ∈ T , e(x) = {x} ∪ {y ∈ T | Ayx ∈ P} .
( 1.4) This interpretation function assigns to each term x in T the set of those terms which are "under" x with respect to A; thus it makes sense to name e(x) the extension of x. 11 It is easy to see that e as defined in (1.4) satisfies the relation (1.1).
Intensional interpretation: Leibniz's characteristic numbers
The most obvious idea for defining an intensional interpretation would, by symmetry with (1.4), be
(1.5)
This, however, does not work because-as we tried to explain above-it is not possible to properly define the truth of i (E x y) and i (I xy) by referring to "superconcepts" i (x) and i (y) alone. Within his framework of characteristic numbers, Leibniz overcame the problem as follows. He considered a situation where, within the set T of terms, there exists a denumerable setT ⊂ T of elementary or simple terms which he numbered using the sequence of prime numbers from 2 on:
2 3 5 7 . . . Now each finite subset ofT can be characterized by a unique number; for example, to the subset {x 2 , x 4 } there will be assigned the number 3 × 7 = 21. 12 Because of the unique prime factorization theorem, also called Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, there exists, for each number n, a unique finite subset ofT , composed of all those simple terms x i which belong to the prime factors of n. 13 Given a general, nonsimple term x ∈ T , the characteristic number of x, written by Leibniz as
is defined as follows 14 : s is the product of prime numbers of elementary properties contained in x, that is, of all elementary properties y such that Ax y holds true. On the other completeness proof of FOL. In the Aristotelian context, saturation is directly connected to Aristotle's ecthesis. See also the alternative completeness theory by Smith (1983) , based on ecthesis. 11 Let us remark that this definition will work properly only for maximal consistent saturated sets P (Martin (1997) ), a concept which we will introduce in the next section. 12 Leibniz's own example of how two terms combine intensionally into a term standing below these two, is as follows: "If, for example, we assume that the item 'animal' is expressed by means of the number 2 (or, in general, by a), and the item 'rational' by means of the number 3 (or, in general, by r), then 'man' is expressed by 2 × 3, i.e. 6, as the result of the product of 2 by 3 (or, in general, by the number a × r)." (My translation of Leibniz, 1999) . 13 Multiple prime factors have to be ignored; that is, the number 63 = 3 2 × 7 denotes the same subset {x 2 , x 4 }as the number 21 = 3 × 7. 14 It is quite clear that +s − σ is an inventive notation for what we today call an ordered pair of numbers, (s, σ ). The +/− sign added a lot of confusion to later readings of Leibniz's papers. For an extensive discussion of the details, see Glashoff (2002) .
hand, σ is the product of all primes belonging to those elementary properties z such that E xz holds. In the context of our example from above: If there is a concept x characterized by {Ax x 1 , Ax x 3 , E x x 4 }, then the characteristic number of x would be +10 − 7. In his groundbreaking book, Łukasiewicz (1957) made use of Leibniz' characteristic numbers within the context of the proof of his completeness theorem. Later, in his thesis, Maldonado (1998) also used this device for an arithmetical semantics of Corcoran's syntax. The aim of the present paper is to free Leibniz' concept from the algebraic context and thus to establish his ideas as a general tool for constructing intensional models of Aristotelian term logic. Following this idea, let us define the interpretation function i a little more sophisticatedly than according to (1.5) by an ordered pair of subsets of T :
This function can now be extended to sentences by the following definitions:
The interpretation of Ox y and I xy results from negating E x y and Ax y, respectively. The rationale behind these definitions is: For x ∈ T , s(x) collects the terms which are "positively" (by means of Ax y) contained in x, and σ (x) contains the terms "negatively" contained in x, that is, by means of E x y. The definition given above for the interpretation of E x y signifies that there is an overlap between the positive and negative components of x and y, respectively. §2. Syntax. In this section we will give a short account of Aristotelian syntax in its modern form, based on a system of natural deduction as given by Corcoran (1972a Corcoran ( , 1972b Corcoran ( , 1974 , and independently, by Smiley (1973) . 15 We will also take into account the generalized version of Martin (1997) For a given set P of propositions, called the premises, the Aristotelian system allows for the generation of new, additional sentences not contained in P governed by the following rules. (1) Conversions:
(2) Perfect syllogisms:
A proof or deduction of a proposition d from a set of premises P is of two different types: DEFINITION 2.2.
(1) A direct deduction of a sentence d from P is a finite list of sentences, beginning with all or some sentences of P and ending with d, where each subsequent list element is
-a repetition of a previous line -a conversion of type (C1) , (C2) , (C3) of a previous line -a result of applying one of the perfect syllogisms (P S1) , (P S2) , (P S3) , (P S4) to two previous lines.
(2) An indirect deduction of a sentence d from P is defined as a direct deduction of a pair of contradictions e and C(e) from P ∪ {C(d)} .
A set of propositions is inconsistent if there are two deductions having all premises in the set and having contradictory conclusions. Otherwise, a set is consistent. A consistent set having no consistent supersets is maximally consistent. LEMMA 2.3. (Corcoran, 1972b; Martin, 1997 ) Let S be maximally consistent. Then the following hold:
3) exactly one of Ax y, Ox y ∈ S; (4) exactly one of I xy, E x y ∈ S; (5) at least one of I xy, Ox y ∈ S; (6) at most one of Ax y, E x y ∈ S. DEFINITION 2.4. (Martin, 1997) S is a saturated maximally consistent set iff S is maximally consistent and (1) I xy ∈ S iff, for some z, Azx, Azy ∈ S; (2) Ox y ∈ S iff, for some z, Azx, Ezy ∈ S. LEMMA 2.5. (Martin, 1997 ) Every consistent set is extensible to a saturated maximally consistent set. §3. An intensional semantics. Let us go back to the notion of intensional interpretation of (1.2.2) which we will now define precisely.
Let M denote a nonempty set, let ⊆ 2 M denote a nonempty subset of the power set of M, and let O = × . 
A (syllogistic) intensional semantics consists of a set of intensional interpretations F = {(O, i)}(for varying O as well as i). It is useful to have at hand the following standard notation: DEFINITION 3.2. Let P denote a set of sentences of L, and let F be a given intensional semantics.
•
As usual, we write P | d iff P | F d for all intensional semantics F. It is now easy to confirm the following semantic version of some of the items of Lemma 2.3: Proof. Let = 2 T , and let us define, for x ∈ T,
Let us first show that this defines indeed an intensional interpretation according to Definition 3.1. For this, we have only to prove s(x) = ∅ and
. Then, Ax z and E xz are in P, which is impossible by the consistency of P.
We then prove that, for any d = U xy, U ∈ {A, I, E, O}, x, y ∈ T , it holds true that
Case 1: d = Ax y. " ⇒ " : First we show that d ∈ P implies s(y) ⊆ s(x) and σ (y) ⊆ σ (x). For any z ∈ s(y), we have Ayz ∈ P which, together with d = Ax y ∈ P, results in Ax z ∈ P, by (PS1), thus z ∈ s(x). Hence s(y) ⊆ s(x). For any z ∈ σ (y), E yz ∈ P. Together with Ax y ∈ P, this implies (by means of (PS2)) E xz ∈ P, hence z ∈ σ (x). Therefore, σ (y) ⊆ σ (x). " ⇐ " : Let us assume that s(y) ⊆ s(x) and σ (y) ⊆ σ (x), but (reductio) Ax y / ∈ P. Since P is maximal, Ox y ∈ P. By saturation, there is a z ∈ T such that Azx, Ezy ∈ P. Hence, z ∈ σ (y) and z ∈ σ (x). Hence, Ezx ∈ P which is not possible, since Azx ∈ P has been assumed to hold.
Case 2: d = E x y. " ⇒ " : As E x y ∈ P implies E yx ∈ P, it follows that x ∈ σ (y), implying s(x) ∩ σ (y) = ∅ because of x ∈ s(x). According to the definition, i(d) = true. " ⇐ " : In the first case, assume s(x) ∩ σ (y) = ∅ ; hence there is a z ∈ T such that Ax z ∈ P and E yz ∈ P implying E x y ∈ P by means of (PS2). Second: s(y) ∩ σ (x) = ∅ implies Ayz, E xz ∈ P for some z ∈ P, hence again E x y ∈ P.
Case 3: d = I xy. " ⇒ " : By saturation, there is a z ∈ T such that Azx, Azy ∈ P. Hence s(x) ∪ s(y) ⊆ s(z) and σ (x) ∪ σ (y) ⊆ σ (z) (see Case 1 of this proof). By definition of s(z) and σ (z), s(z) ∩ σ (z) = ∅. Hence s(x) ∩ σ (y) = ∅ and s(y) ∩ σ (x) = ∅, implying i(d) = true. " ⇐ " : Let us assume I xy / ∈ P; hence E x y ∈ P by Lemma 2.3(4). Case 2 of this proof shows that i(E x y) = true, hence i(I xy) = f alse, which proves the assertion.
Case 4: d = Ox y. " ⇒ " : By saturation, for some z ∈ T , Azx, Ezy ∈ P. Hence, by Azx ∈ P, s(x) ⊆ s(z), σ (x) ⊆ σ (z). Let us assume (reductio) that s(y) ⊆ s(x) and σ (y) ⊆ σ (x), then s(y) ⊆ s(z) and σ (y) ⊆ σ (z). Hence Ayz ∈ P, contradicting Ezy ∈ P. " ⇐ " : Let us assume Ox y / ∈ P, hence Ax y ∈ P by Lemma 2.3(3) . Case 1 of this proof (" ⇒ ") shows that i(Ax y) = true, hence i(Ox y) = f alse, which proves the assertion.
THEOREM 3.5. (Intensional correctness theorem): P d iff P d.
Proof.
